In this brief note, we prove that the existence of Nash equilibria on integer programming games is Σ p 2 -complete.
Introduction
Integer programming games (IPGs) model games in which there is a finite set of players M = {1, 2 . . . , m} and each player p ∈ M has a set of feasible strategies X p given by lattice points inside a polytopes described by finite systems of linear inequalities. Therefore, each players aims to solve max
where x p is player p's strategy and x −p is the vector of strategies of all players, except player p.
A vector x ∈ p∈M X p is called a pure profile of strategies. If a pure profile of strategies x solves the optimization problem (1) for all players, it is called pure Nash equilibrium. A game may fail to have pure equilibria and, therefore, a broader solution concept for a game must be introduced, the Nash equilibria. Under this concept, each player can assign probabilities to her pure strategies. Let ∆ p denote the space of Borel probability measures over X p and ∆ = p∈M ∆ p . Each player p's expected payoff for a profile of strategies σ ∈ ∆ is
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a profile of strategies σ ∈ ∆ such that
In [1] , the authors discuss the existence of Nash equilibria for integer programming games. It is proven that the existence of pure Nash equilibria for IPGs is Σ p 2 -complete and that even the existence of Nash equilibria is Σ p 2 -complete. However, the later proof seems incomplete in the "proof of only if", since it does not support why we can conclude that the leader cannot guarantee a payoff of 1. In the following section, we provide a correct proof using a completely new reduction.
Computational Complexity
In what follows, we show that even in the simplest case, linear integer programming games with two players, the existence of Nash equilibria is a Σ Proof. The proof that this decision problem belongs to Σ p 2 can be found in [1] . It remains to show that it is Σ p 2 -hard. We will reduce the following to Σ QUESTION Does there exist an integer S with R ≤ S < R + 2 r such that none of the subsets I ⊆ {1, . . . , k} satisfies i∈I q i = S?
Our reduction starts from an instance of SUBSET-SUM-INTERVAL. We construct the following instance of IPG
• The game has two players, M = {Z, W }.
• Player Z solves
Add binary variables y ∈ {0, 1} r and make z = R + r−1
Thus, replace y i z by h i and add the respective McCormick constraints [3] . In this way, we can equivalently linearize the previous problem:
For sake of simplicity, we consider the quadratic formulation (4). The linearization above serves the purpose of showing that the proof is valid even under linear utility functions for the players.
• Player W solves
(Proof of if). Assume that the SUBSET-SUM-INTERVAL instance has answer YES. Then, there is R ≤ S < R + 2 r such that for all subsets I ⊆ {1, . . . , k}, we have i∈I q i = S. Let player W strategy be w * = S and w * 0 = 0. Note that the term Qz(2w − z) in player Z's utility is dominant and attains a maximum when z is equal to w. Thus, make z * = w * = S and since k i=1 q i z i is at most S − 1, make z * 0 = 1. Choose z * i such that the remaining utility of player Z is maximized. By construction, player Z is selecting her best response to (w * , w * 0 ). Sinze z * 0 = 1, then player W is also selecting an optimal strategy. Therefore, we can conclude that there is an equilibrium.
(Proof of only if). Assume that the SUBSET-SUM-INTERVAL instances has answer NO. Then, for all R ≤ S < R + 2 r , there is a subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , k} such that i∈I q i = S. In this case, player Z will always make z 0 = 0 which gives incentive for player W to choose w 0 as large as possible. Since w 0 has no upper bound, there is no equilibrium for the game.
